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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEARCHES
AND MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
State v. Schmidt
In State v. Schmidt,1 Deven Schmidt (“Schmidt”) appealed from district
court orders deferring imposition of sentence after he conditionally pled
guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and conspiracy to deliver a
controlled substance.2 On appeal, Schmidt argued that the district court
erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence that was obtained in
violation of his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, “concluding the district court
properly denied Schmidt’s motion to suppress evidence.”4
In March 2014, a law enforcement officer served a bench warrant on
Schmidt’s roommate, Devin Lavallie (“Lavallie”).5 Schmidt answered the
door, informed the officer that Lavallie was sleeping, and let the officer
enter the residence.6 The officer executed the bench warrant on Lavallie
and subsequently arrested him.7 During the arrest, the officer observed
drug paraphernalia in Lavallie’s room.8 Lavallie was handcuffed and
placed in the living room while the officer handcuffed Schmidt.9 The
officer testified that Schmidt was detained for safety purposes and for
further investigation.10 The officer observed paraphernalia in the living
room,11 and then obtained consent from Schmidt and Lavallie to search the
rest of the residence where the officers found paraphernalia in Schmidt’s
bedroom.12
Schmidt was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.13 He
moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the officer did not have authority
or consent to enter the residence to execute the bench warrant on Lavallie.14
The district court suppressed evidence obtained from the search, and the

1. 2016 ND 187, 885 N.W.2d 65.
2. Schmidt, ¶ 1, 885 N.W.2d at 68.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Schmidt, ¶ 2, 885 N.W.2d at 68.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 3.
13. Id. ¶ 4.
14. Schmidt, ¶ 4, 885 N.W.2d at 68.
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State appealed.15 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district
court’s suppression order in State v. Schmidt,16 finding that the officer had
legal authority to execute the bench warrant on Lavallie.17 The Court then
remanded the case.18 On remand, Schmidt moved to suppress evidence on
grounds that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights.19 Schmidt
based this argument on the facts that the officer opened his bedroom door,
removed him from his room and that he was coerced into consenting an
additional search.20 The district court denied Schmidt’s motion to
suppress.21 Schmidt entered conditional guilty pleas.22 Subsequently,
Schmidt appealed from both orders deferring imposition of sentence.23
On appeal, Schmidt argued that his Fourth Amendment24 rights had
been violated.25 Specifically, he argued that he was illegally detained.26
The standard of review for a district court’s determination on a motion to
suppress is well settled:
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, this Court defers to a trial court’s findings of fact, and
conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance because
we recognize the trial court is in a superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and weigh evidence. “A district court’s
findings of fact on a motion to suppress will not be reversed if
there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting
the court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence.” “Questions of law are fully
reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal
standard is a question of law.”27
Schmidt further argued that the officer should have left the residence
after locating Lavallie.28 The district court rejected that argument finding

15. Id.
16. 2015 ND 134, ¶ 11, 864 N.W.2d 265 [hereinafter Schmidt I].
17. Schmidt, ¶ 5, 885 N.W.2d at 68.
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Schmidt, ¶ 6, 885 N.W.2d at 68.
24. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
North Dakota Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
25. Schmidt, ¶ 9, 885 N.W.2d at 69.
26. Id.
27. Id. ¶ 7 (citing to Schmidt I (citation omitted)).
28. Id. ¶ 11.
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that he “was detained and handcuffed for officer safety after evidence of
illegal activity was discovered.”29 Moreover, law enforcement officers
may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain an
individual for investigative purposes when there is no probable cause to
make an arrest if a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists that criminal
activity is afoot.30 Additionally, in Michigan v. Summers,31 the United
States Supreme Court held that officers executing a search warrant have
authority to “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is
conducted.”32
In affirming the district court’s decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, the search
and detention of Schmidt was reasonable.33 The detention was based on
evidence found in plain view, the officers had reason to believe Schmidt
was a resident of the home, intrusion into his room was minimal, and while
in the residence, the officer formed reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.34 Furthermore, suppression was not warranted because Schmidt
gave consent to the search.35
Schmidt then argued that his consent was not voluntarily made.36
Warrantless searches inside a person’s residence are presumptively
unreasonable, unless it falls under an exception to the warrant
requirement.37 Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.38 “A
district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances.’”39 The factors the North Dakota Supreme
Court considered in determining whether Schmidt’s consent was voluntary
were as follows:
(1) the characteristics and condition of the accused at the time of
the consent, including age, sex, race, education level, physical or
mental condition, and prior experience with police; and (2) the
details of the setting in which the consent was obtained, including
the duration and conditions of detention, police attitude toward the

29.
30.
31.
32.
(1981)).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 70 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968)).
452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
Schmidt, ¶ 15, 885 N.W.2d at 72 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705
Id. ¶ 19, 885 N.W.2d at 73.
Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 885 N.W.2d at 72-73.
Id. ¶ 20, 855 N.W.2d at 73.
Id. ¶ 21, 855 N.W.2d at 73-73.
Id. ¶ 15, 885 N.W.2d at 72.
Schmidt, ¶ 23, 855 N.W.2d at 74.
Id. (citing State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d 309, 313).
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defendant, and the diverse pressures that sap the accused’s powers
of resistance or self control.40
Schmidt admitted that he signed the consent form; however, that alone
is not enough to determine voluntariness of the consent.41 The Court also
looked at Schmidt’s behavior, characteristics, and condition. The Court
recognized that he was stressed, nervous, calm, not combative and
cooperated with law enforcement.42 Although Schmidt was detained and
not free to leave, the court concluded that his content was not coerced.43
The Court found that the officers made legal entry into the residence, they
observed paraphernalia in plain view which gave rise to reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the officer legally arrested both
Lavallie and Schmidt, and no search of the home was conducted prior to
obtaining consent.44 “Given [the court’s] deferential standard of review of
a district court’s finding of voluntary consent, based on the totality of the
circumstances, [the Court] conclude[s] sufficient competent evidence
supports the district court’s finding, and its finding is not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence.”45

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. ¶ 24 (quoting State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 21, 685 N.W.2d 512, 519).
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 27, 855 N.W.2d at 75.
Schmidt, ¶ 27, 855 N.W.2d at 75.
Id. ¶ 32, 855 N.W.2d at 76.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—JUDGMENT—APPEAL AND ERROR—
ZONING AND PLANNING
Ferguson v. City of Fargo
Ferguson v. City of Fargo involved owners of unplatted property
adjacent to a river bringing a declaratory judgment action against the city,
seeking declaration that an ordinance relating to construction on property
located near rivers violated equal protection because it treated platted and
unplatted property differently.46 The district court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional as it applied to the owners, Edward and Lavonna Ferguson
(“Fergusons”), and others similarly situated.47 The City of Fargo (“Fargo”)
appealed.48 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
ordinance did not violate equal protection.49
In May 2012, after historic flooding, Fargo enacted Ordinance 4818
(the “Ordinance”).50 The Ordinance prohibited construction within certain
setback areas of the Red, Wild Rice, and Sheyenne Rivers.51 Fargo’s stated
primary purpose in enacting the ordinance was to limit or prevent new
construction within setback areas near river banks and drains to protect
citizens, private property, and city infrastructure from Red River Valley
floodwaters.52
With respect to the ordinance’s exceptions to the prohibition on
construction, it created a distinction between platted property (property that
has been subdivide into blocks and lots) and unplatted property (property
that has not been subdivided).53 Under the ordinance, owners of vacant
property platted before the ordinance’s effective date could apply for a
waiver from the construction prohibition.54 Owners of unplatted property
could not apply for a waiver.55
The Fergusons owned approximately six acres of unplatted property
adjacent to the Sheyenne River that is partially within the ordinance’s
setback areas.56 After the ordinance went into effect, the Fergusons

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

2016 ND 194, 886 N.W.2d 557.
Id. ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 558.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Ferguson, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 558.
Id. ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
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requested a waiver seeking to develop their property into multiple singlefamily duplexes.57 Fargo denied the request because the property was not
platted.58
The Fergusons brought a declaratory judgment action against Fargo.59
The Fergusons asked the district court to declare that the ordinance violated
the equal protection clauses of the North Dakota Constitution and the
United States Constitution because it treated platted and unplatted property
differently.60 Fargo argued that its distinction between platted and
unplatted property was rationally related to a legitimate government interest
in limiting new construction on property subject to flooding, and was
therefore, not in violation of the equal protection clauses.61
The district court found in favor of the Fergusons.62 It found that the
ordinance treated platted and unplatted property differently.63 The court
noted that “[p]latting does not change the character of the land at issue” and
“[w]hether land is platted or unplatted does not make it more or less likely
to be subject to slumping or flooding.”64 The court concluded that the
ordinance’s distinction between platted and unplatted property was not
rationally related to Fargo’s interest in preventing new construction on river
bank lands subject to soil instability or flooding and the management of
waiver requests.65 The court declared the ordinance unconstitutional as
applied to the Fergusons and others similarly situated.66 Fargo appealed the
judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.67
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed.68 The Court explained that
“[t]he equal protection clause does not forbid classifications, but prevents
‘government decision-makers from treating differently persons who are in
all relevant respects alike.’”69 Agreeing with Fargo, the Court held that the
ordinance, in making a distinction between platted and unplatted property,
did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the

57. Id.
58. Ferguson, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 559.
59. Id. ¶ 5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Ferguson, ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 559.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 558.
68. Id. ¶ 16, 886 N.W.2d at 563.
69. Id. ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 560 (quoting Hamich, Inc. v. State ex rel. Clayburgh, 1997 ND
110, ¶ 31, 564 N.W.2d 640, 647).
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legitimate government interest of limiting new construction on property
subject to flooding.70 The Court noted Fargo had distinguished platted from
unplatted property near rivers because there were a finite number of vacant
platted properties, and developers and owners had shown an intent to build
in the future by completing platting process or purchasing platted
property.71
Justice Crothers dissented from the majority, arguing that denial of a
right on the sole basis that the land was not platted before May 2012,
stripped away property owners’ ability to ever request a waiver from the
building restrictions.72 Their property is “frozen in time. But platted
property is not.”73 As differing treatment is based solely on whether the
land was platted in 2012, the Court must consider whether platting land
before May 2012 advances the governmental interests.74 Justice Crothers
argued it did not.75 “While the owner/developer’s investment of time and
money may correlate to Fargo’s potential liability for halting all
development of platted land,” it provided “no rational basis for permitting
waivers in platted land and preventing waivers in land that was unplatted in
May of 2012.”76

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Ferguson, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 558.
Id. ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 563.
Id. ¶ 20, 886 N.W.2d at 564 (Crothers, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Ferguson, ¶ 25, 886 N.W.2d at 564-65.
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CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS—SERVICE OF
PROCESS
Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC
In Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC,
Goliath Energy Services, LLC, (“Goliath”) and George Satterfield
(“Satterfield”) challenged district court orders denying their motions to
vacate default judgments entered against them in favor of Monster Heavy
Hauler, LLC, (“Monster”) and Rossco Crane and Rigging, Inc.
(“Rossco”).77 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that (1) signed return
receipts for service by certified mail raised a rebuttable presumption of
valid service of process;78 and (2) unchallenged allegations in complaints
were sufficient to provide basis for piercing the corporate veil.79
The litigants in this case are in the business of oil field construction,
trucking, and rigging.80 Goliath is a limited liability company with its
principal place of business located in Grand Junction, Colorado.81
Satterfield was Goliath’s president and Karl Troestler (“Troestler”) was its
chief financial officer.82 Both Rossco, and later Monster, sued Goliath,
Troestler, and Satterfield to collect payment of outstanding balances owed
for services provided to Goliath.83 Rossco sought $95,243.80 plus interest,
and Monster sought $226,431.35 plus interest.84
Rossco commenced its action by service of its Summons and
Complaint through certified mail in November 2014.85 Goliath, Satterfield,
and Troestler were each served at three separate addresses, two in Grand
Junction and one in Alexander, ND.86 The three return receipts from
Alexander were signed by “Larry Adams” and “J. Leigh,” who marked the
“Agent” boxes on the receipts.87 The six return receipts from the Grand
Junction addresses were signed by “Sherry Bley,” who did not mark either

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

2016 ND 176, ¶ 1, 883 N.W.2d 917, 919.
Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 20, 883 N.W.2d at 926.
Id. ¶ 27, 883 N.W.2d at 928.
Id. ¶ 2, 883 N.W.2d at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 2, 883 N.W.2d at 919.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
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the “Agent” or “Addressee” boxes.88 The defendants did not file answer to
Rossco’s Complaint.89
Rossco filed a motion for default judgment on January 6, 2015.90
Satterfield then phoned Rossco’s attorney on January 16, 2015, to request
copies of Rossco’s Summons and Complaint and default judgment motion
be emailed to him.91 Rossco’s attorney sent Satterfield a test email to
confirm his email address, and Satterfield also requested the documents be
emailed to a Colorado attorney.92 On January 20, 2015, Satterfield sent an
email to Rossco’s attorney, the Colorado attorney, and the North Dakota
attorney representing Goliath and Satterfield in these appeals stating he had
talked to Rossco’s manager and “they have agreed to stand down and work
with me.”93 On January 21, 2015, Rossco’s attorney emailed Satterfield
and copied the Colorado and North Dakota attorneys informing Satterfield
that the judge had signed the order for default judgment, but that Rossco’s
attorney would not prepare a judgment at that time, due to negotiations
between the parties.94
Then, on January 29, 2015, Rossco’s attorney sent an email to
Satterfield informing him that he also represented Monster and that Monster
had filed a well and pipeline lien in Billings County, ND for a debt owed by
Goliath.95 Satterfield asked Monster’s tell the North Dakota lawyer about
that lien, but the North Dakota attorney told Monster’s attorney “[a]t this
time you can communicate directly with Goliath. I will let you know if that
changes.”96 On February 23, 2015, Satterfield emailed Monster’s attorney
to ask if Monster’s position had changed after Satterfield spoke with
Monster’s general manager.97 The negotiations between the parties
ultimately failed.98
Monster commenced its action by service of its Summons and
Complaint through certified mail in March 2015. Goliath, Satterfield, and
Troestler were each served at the same address in Grand Junction.99 Two
return receipts for Satterfield and Troestler were signed by “Sherry Bley,”

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 4, 883 N.W.2d at 919.
Id.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 5, 883 N.W.2d at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
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who indicated actual delivery occurred at a different Grand Junction
address.100 Neither the “Agent” nor “Addressee” boxes were marked. The
defendants never filed answers to the Monster Complaint.101
Monster obtained a judgment on June 9, 2015, for $240,107.23,
because of the defendant’s failure to respond to Monster’s motion for
default judgment.102 On July 29, 2015, Rossco advised its attorney that
negotiations had also failed with the defendants.103 Default judgment was
entered against the defendants in favor of Rossco for $97,233.04 on August
3, 2015.104
After Monster moved to compel answers to interrogatories in aid of
judgment and execution, the North Dakota attorney filed a Notice of
Appearance on behalf of Goliath and Satterfield.105 On November 23,
2015, Goliath and Satterfield filed motions to vacate the default judgments
obtained by both Monster and Rossco.106 Goliath and Satterfield argued
that (1) service of process was insufficient, and (2) Monster and Rossco had
failed to present adequate proof to pierce Goliath’s corporate veil and hold
Satterfield personally liable for the debts of Goliath.107 The district court
denied both motions on February 2, 2016, finding the service of Summons
and Complaint were properly effectuated on the defendants and that the
defendants failed to timely respond to the motions for default judgment.108
The district court also found Goliath and Satterfield’s defense of
insufficiency of process was effectively waived by the defendants deliberate
failure to timely raise it.109 Goliath and Satterfield appealed the district
court judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court.110
Goliath and Satterfield argued the district court erred in denying their
motions to vacate the default judgments against them under North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 60(b).111 Goliath and Satterfield

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 7, 883 N.W.2d at 920.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 8.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 8, 883 N.W.2d at 920-21.
109. Id. at 921.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 9; N.D. R. CIV. P. § 60(b) (2017) states in relevant part:
“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with

504

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92:493

were required to show the district court abused its discretion in entering the
default judgments against them,112 which occurs when a court acts in an
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.113 To prove abuse of
discretion, Goliath and Satterfield bore the burden of establishing sufficient
grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment.114 The Court also noted
that Goliath’s and Satterfield’s own errors may not constitute proper
grounds for relief from a default judgment.115 To rule a default as void or
valid, a district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over the parties.116
Goliath and Satterfield argued the default judgments against them were
void for lack of personal jurisdiction, because Monster and Rossco did not
prove the individuals who accepted service of the Summons and
Complaints were authorized to do so on their behalf.117 Personal
jurisdiction is acquired by service of process in compliance with N.D. R.
CIV. P. 4.118 The Court noted that a sheriff’s return of service of process
creates a rebuttable presumption that service was actually made, which
shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the service was not properly
effectuated.119 There is also a disputable presumption that a letter duly
directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail.120 North
Dakota statutory law is similar to the federal common law “mailbox

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
112. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 10, 883 N.W.2d at 921 (quoting Shull v. Walcker, 2009 ND
142, ¶¶ 13-14, 770 N.W.2d 274, 279).
113. Id. (citing US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Arnold, 2001 ND 130, ¶ 21, 631 N.W.2d 150, 155).
114. Id. (citing Follman v. Upper Valley Special Educ. Unit, 2000 ND 72, ¶ 10, 609 N.W.2d
90, 93).
115. Id. (citing Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, 2005 ND 120, ¶ 40, 699
N.W.2d 421, 435-36).
116. Id. ¶ 11, 883 N.W.2d at 921-22 (citing Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. Smith, 2013 ND 117, ¶
18, 833 N.W.2d 464, 471).
117. Id. ¶ 12, 883 N.W.2d at 922.
118. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶¶ 13-14, 883 N.W.2d at 922-23; N.D. R. CIV. P. § 4 (2017)
states in relevant part:
“Service must be made on a domestic or foreign corporation or on a partnership or
other unincorporated association, by: (i) delivering a copy of the summons to an
officer, director, superintendent or managing or general agent, or partner, or associate,
or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on its
behalf, or to one who acted as an agent for the defendant with respect to the matter on
which the plaintiff’s claim is based and who was an agent of the defendant at the time
of service . . . (iii) any form of mail or third-party commercial delivery addressed to
any of the foregoing persons and requiring a signed receipt and resulting in delivery to
that person.”
119. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 14, 883 N.W.2d at 923 (citing Farm Credit Bank v.
Stedman, 449 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D. 1989)).
120. Id. ¶ 15 (citing First Bank v. Neset, 1997 ND 4, ¶ 18, 559 N.W.2d 211, 214).
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rule,”121 which provides that “the proper and timely mailing of a document
raises a rebuttable presumption that the document has been received by the
addressee in the usual time.”122 The Court noted that many jurisdictions
have adopted rebuttable presumptions regarding certified mail for the
purpose of service of process,123 and stated that “a rebuttable presumption
of valid process arises when a return receipt for certified mail is signed, and
that the signator, if not the addressee, will be presumed to have acted as the
agent of the addressee authorized to accept service in the absence of proof
to the contrary.”124
The Court found that Goliath’s and Satterfield’s position that Monster
and Rossco did not have personal jurisdiction over them was flawed for
four reasons: (1) a sheriff’s return creates a rebuttable presumption that
service was validly effected, and certified mail is also an authorized method
for valid service;125 (2) “Larry Adams” and “J. Leigh” marked the “Agent”
boxes in the receipts, giving them presumptive agency status;126 (3) the
burden to prove that the signators were not authorized to accept service of
process was on Goliath and Satterfield, and they did not meet that
burden;127 and (4) Goliath and Satterfield had knowledge of both
underlying collection actions, including the default judgment motions, and
they had the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for disturbing the
finality of the judgments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which they failed to
do.128
As such, the Court reasoned the signed return receipts for certified mail
raised a rebuttable presumption of valid service of process.129 Monster and
Rossco presented evidence of valid service, and Goliath and Satterfield
failed to present anything to rebut that evidence.130 Further, Goliath and
Satterfield did not even claim the signators were unauthorized to accept
service on their behalf.131 As such, the Court held the district court did not
err in ruling service of process was sufficient and the court thus had

121. Schikore v. Bank America Supplemental Retirement Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir.
2001).
122. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 15, 883 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Schikore, 269 F.3d at 961).
123. Id. ¶ 16, 883 N.W.2d at 923-24 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d
1134, 1137 (4th Cir. 1984)).
124. Id. ¶ 17, 883 N.W.2d at 924.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 925.
128. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 18, 883 N.W.2d at 925.
129. Id. ¶ 19, 883 N.W.2d at 926.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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personal jurisdiction over Goliath and Satterfield in the collection
actions.132
Satterfield next argued the district court erred in refusing to grant him
relief from the default judgments because piercing the corporate veil
requires “proof” before he could be found personally liable for the
judgments.133 To determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced,
the Court considers the factors laid out in Coughlin Constr. Co., Inc. v. NuTec Indus., Inc.,134 which include:
insufficient capitalization for the purposes of the corporate
undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment
of dividends, insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time of
the transaction in question, siphoning of funds by the dominant
shareholder, nonfunctioning of other officers and directors,
absence of corporate records, and the existence of the corporation
as merely a façade for individual dealings.135
An element of injustice, inequity, or fundamental unfairness must also be
present to properly pierce the corporate veil.136
In their default judgments motions, Monster and Rossco submitted
affidavits of proof in which they stated they had personal knowledge of the
facts contained in their Complaints. Among other things, the Complaints
alleged “George Satterfield was President of Goliath . . . Karl Troestler was
Chief Financial Officer of Goliath . . . [Goliath and Troestler] comingled
corporation funds, failed to follow corporation formalities and was [sic]
undercapitalized.”137 The Court reasoned those allegations constituted
relevant factors for piercing the corporate veil and placed Satterfield and
Troestler on notice that Monster and Rossco were seeking to pierce the
corporate veil. As such, the Court held that those allegations, sworn to by
the plaintiffs and unchallenged by Satterfield, are sufficient to provide the
basis for piercing the corporate veil in the default judgment proceedings.138
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

132. Id. ¶ 20.
133. Id. ¶ 21.
134. 2008 ND 163, ¶ 20, 755 N.W.2d 867.
135. Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 23, 883 N.W.2d at 926-27 (quoting Hilzendager v. Skwarok,
335 N.W.2d 768, 774 (N.D. 1983)).
136. Id. ¶ 21, 883 N.W.2d at 927 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 564 (N.D.
1985)).
137. Id. ¶ 25.
138. Id. ¶ 26.
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the motions for relief from the defaults judgment and affirmed its
decision.139

139. Id. ¶ 27.
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CRIMINAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—ARREST
State v. Adan
State v. Adan, involved a continued detention of a vehicle during a
traffic stop until a K-9 unit arrived.140 Defendants Abdullahi Ahmed Adan
(“Adan”) and Semereab Haile Tesfaye (“Tesfaye”) each entered conditional
guilty pleas in district court for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to manufacture or deliver, following denial of their motions to
suppress evidence gathered as a result of the continued detention.141
Defendants appealed the denial of their motions to suppress evidence.142
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the continued
detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances.143
On the day of the arrest, Officer Steven Clark observed a car that
appeared to weave in its lane and noticed that the vehicle was from out of
state.144 Officer Clark turned around to follow it.145 From several car
lengths behind, Officer Clark saw the driver reach into the backseat of the
vehicle and appear to place something like a blanket over something in the
backseat.146 Officer Clark pulled up next to the vehicle and observed the
driver with his hands at ten and two on the wheel, staring intently forward,
and a passenger who appeared to be sleeping.147 Officer Clark observed the
driver moving the corner of his mouth, as if he were trying to hide his
conversation with the passenger.148 However, not seeing any traffic
infractions, Officer Clark stopped following the vehicle.149
Officer Clark relayed his suspicions to Officer Steve Edwards, who
then located the vehicle.150 Officer Edwards observed the vehicle speeding
and following too close to the vehicle in front of it.151 Based on these
traffic violations, Officer Edwards initiated a traffic stop,152 during which
Officer Edwards observed a blanket covering about half of the backseat, an
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

2016 ND 215, 886 N.W.2d 841.
Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 842-43.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Adan, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Adan, ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 843.
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air freshener, a bottle of Ozone scent spray, eye drops, and an energy drink
in the vehicle.153
Adan, the driver, and Tesfaye, the passenger, both acted nervously.154
When Officer Edwards questioned Adan and Tesfaye individually about
their trip, they gave conflicting stories.155 Tesfaye was unable to recall the
name of the passenger they had dropped off, even though they allegedly
rode with him for a couple of days.156 A records check indicated that
Tesfaye had recently been put on probation for possession of
methamphetamine.157 After the traffic stop, Officer Edwards issued Adan a
warning.158 Adan then agreed to answer a few more questions about their
trip.159 Officer Edwards later asked for permission to search the vehicle and
have a dog walk around it.160 Adan did not consent.161 Officer Edwards
called dispatch to send a K-9 to his location.162 Forty-five minutes later, a
K-9 arrived and signaled the presence of narcotics.163 A search of the
vehicle revealed over two pounds of marijuana.164
Whether the facts support a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion
in the context of an investigative stop is a question of law, and thus, is fully
reviewable by the North Dakota Supreme Court.165 When the original
purpose of a traffic stop is complete, the officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to continue the detention.166 Any
further detention, without reasonable suspicion, violates the traffic
offender’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.167
On appeal, Adan and Tesfaye argued that after they were given a
written warning for their driving conduct, Officer Edwards lacked a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to continue to detain
them.168 When deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
Adan, ¶ 8, 886 N.W.2d at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adan, ¶ 8, 886 N.W.2d at 844.
Id. ¶ 9 (citing State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 6, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245).
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 845.
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looks at the totality of the circumstances.169 Information obtained by one
officer may be used by another to establish reasonable suspicion if the first
officer conveyed the information to the second officer.170
Tesfaye argued that innocent conduct, such as possession of eye drops,
energy drinks, and driving a rental vehicle, cannot be used to establish
reasonable suspicion.171 The Court disagreed, noting that while such
conduct in isolation is not inherently suspicious, it looks at the totality of
the circumstances to determine if reasonable suspicion exists.172 Therefore,
considering the totality of the circumstances, including (1) Adan and
Tesfaye both acting nervous, (2) they told Officer Edwards conflicting
stories about the trip, (3) Tesfaye did not know the name of the passenger
they dropped off, (4) the vehicle contained masking agents, eye drops, and
an energy drink, (5) Tesfaye had recently been put on probation for
possession of methamphetamine, and (6) the vehicle was a rental, the Court
concluded there was reasonable suspicion that Adan and Tesfaye were
engaged in criminal activity.173 Thus, their continued detention until a K–9
unit arrived was lawful.174
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority, and wrote separately,
stating that while each individual item noted by law enforcement alone
would not be sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, the amalgamation of
the items does.175 She further stated that the dissent incorrectly applied the
the totality of the circumstances test when it attempted to limit what factors
could be considered.176
Justice Crothers also concurred with the majority, and wrote separately,
noting that while the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, there remained a question as to whether the
duration of the detention was reasonable.177 He was troubled by the
defendants’ forty-five-minute detention and questioned whether that
duration of seizure violates the Fourth Amendment.178

169. Id. ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 844.
170. Adan, ¶ 12, 866 N.W.2d at 844 (citing Ell v. Dir., Dep’t of Trans., 2016 ND 164, ¶ 10,
883 N.W.2d 464, 468).
171. Id. ¶ 27, 866 N.W.2d at 847.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶ 30 (McEvers, J., concurring).
176. Adan, ¶ 32, 866 N.W.2d at 848 (McEvers, J., concurring).
177. Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (Crothers, J., concurring).
178. Id. ¶¶ 43-45, 886 N.W.2d at 850-51.
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Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority.179 She argued that a
finding of reasonable suspicion should not be created “based upon piling up
of innocuous facts.”180 She further stated that what Officer Edwards
articulated as bases for his suspicion were not reasonable, such that the stop
should not have continued.181

179. Id. ¶ 51, 886 N.W.2d at 852 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
180. Id. ¶ 59, 886 N.W.2d at 853.
181. Id. ¶ 62, 886 N.W.2d at 854.
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CRIMINAL LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—
ARREST
State v. Patrick
State v. Patrick involved a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence seized after a traffic stop.182 The district court granted defendant
Alexander Patrick’s (“Patrick”) motion to suppress.183 The State appealed,
and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
the officer’s mistaken belief that the statute prohibited operating a vehicle
with more than four illuminated front-facing lights was objectively
reasonable, such that the stop of vehicle with six front-facing lights was
supported by reasonable suspicion.184
A police officer stopped Patrick’s vehicle after observing it had two
head lamps and four fog lights that were noticeably brighter than others on
the road.185 The officer initiated the stop on the mistaken belief that a
statute prohibited operating a vehicle with more than four illuminated frontfacing lights.186 The officer testified he believed Patrick was in violation of
the statute by having six front facing lights that were noticeably brighter
than others on the road.187 The statute, North Dakota Century Code (“N.D.
Cent. Code”) § 39-21-25(2), states:
Whenever a motor vehicle equipped with headlamps . . . is also
equipped with any [] other lamp[s] on the front thereof projecting a
beam of intensity greater than three hundred candlepower, not
more than a total of four of any such lamps on the front of a
vehicle may be lighted. . . .188
The stop led to a search of the vehicle, revealing drugs and a loaded
handgun.189 Patrick moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search.190 He argued that the traffic stop was invalid because the term
“candlepower” in N.D. Cent. Code § 39-21-25(2) was unconstitutionally
vague.191 The district court suppressed the evidence on the grounds that the

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

2016 ND 209, 886 N.W.2d 681.
Id. ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 682.
Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684.
Id. ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 682.
Id.
Id.
Patrick, ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 682 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-25(2) (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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statute the officer relied on was unconstitutionally vague.192 The State
appealed.193
Justice Crothers wrote for a unanimous Court. The validity of the
officer’s stop turned on whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of
the traffic stop to believe Patrick was in violation of the statute.194 The
Court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion, and, as such, the stop
was valid, and the evidence should not have been suppressed.195
Where an officer makes a mistake of law, the “mistake may provide the
reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop only when objectively
reasonable. . . .”196 The Court found that the officer’s mistaken belief was
objectively reasonable, giving the officer the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify the traffic stop.197 The statute prohibited lighting more
than four additional front-facing lamps at one time when the beam of light
is greater than 300 candlepower.198 The officer testified he believed Patrick
was in violation of the statute by having six front-facing lights that were
noticeably brighter than others on the road.199 This evidence, the Court
reasoned, supported a reasonable suspicion to believe Patrick was in
violation of the statute.200
The district court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the statute
the officer relied on was unconstitutionally vague.201 The Court held that
this was improper.202 The validity of the stop did not turn on the
constitutionality of the statute, but on whether reasonable suspicion existed
at the time of the traffic stop to believe Patrick was in violation of the
statute.203 As the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Patrick was in
violation of the statute, the stop was valid.204 Thus, the district court erred
in suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the stop.205 Accordingly, the
Court reversed the district court order suppressing evidence and remanded
for further proceedings.206
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Patrick, ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 682.
Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684.
Id. ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Hirschkorn, 2016 ND 117, ¶ 14, 881 N.W.2d 244, 248-49).
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
Patrick, ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684.
Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 682.
See id. ¶¶ 6-8, 886 N.W.2d at 683.
Id. ¶ 8.
See id. ¶¶ 8-10, 886 N.W.2d at 683-84.
Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684.
Patrick, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 684.
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CRIMINAL LAW – IMPLIED CONSENT AND SUSPENSION OF
DRIVING PRIVILEGES
Koehly v. Levi
In Koehly v. Levi,207 Koehly appealed a district court judgment
affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation (“DOT”) hearing
officer’s order suspending his driving privileges for 180 days.208 Koehly
argued that the implied consent law, as to breath tests, violated the state and
federal constitutions, he cured his refusal, and the police officers violated
his limited right to counsel.209 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the district court.210
Koehly was cited for driving under the influence in July 2015.211
While at the police station, Koehly was placed in a holding room.212 There,
Koehly had his cell phone and proceeded to contact family and friends.213
He made no attempt to contact an attorney.214 The arresting officer asked
Koehly to consent to a breath test, which Koehly did not answer and
eventually refused the breath test.215 Subsequently, Koehly requested a
blood test instead of a breath test.216 The officer denied the request.217
In August of 2015, the DOT held a hearing on whether Koehly’s
license should be suspended for his refusal of a chemical test.218 The
hearing officer found that Koehly refused the breath test.219 Koehly
unsuccessfully petitioned the DOT for reconsideration.220 He appealed the
agency’s findings to the district court.221 The district court affirmed the
DOTs findings. Additionally, the court concluded that the arresting officer
did not violate Koehly’s right to counsel and the implied consent law

207.
208.
209.
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2016 ND 202, 886 N.W.2d 689.
Koehly, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Koehly, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 690.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Koehly, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 691.
Id.
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relating to breath tests was not unconstitutional.222 Koehly then appealed
the district court judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court.223
Chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code (“N.D. Cent. Code”)
governs North Dakota implied consent law.224 The chapter provides that
the DOT may revoke the driving privileges of a person who refuses a breath
test during a lawful arrest.225 The parties agreed that Koehly initially
refused a breath test.226 Koehly, however, argued that he cured his earlier
refusal by consenting to a breath test.227 The first issue, which the Court
reviewed de novo, was whether North Dakota’s implied consent laws
violated various federal and state constitutional provisions.228 The second
issue was whether police officers violated Koehly’s limited right to counsel
by placing him in a recorded and monitored room.229 Finally, the third
issue was whether Koehly cured his earlier refusal to consent to the
chemical test.230
The Court rejected Koehly’s first argument that his revocation violated
various provisions of the federal and state constitutions.231 Furthermore,
North Dakota’s implied consent law regarding breath tests was recently
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.232 In Birchfield v. North
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution
permits breath tests as searches incident to lawful arrests for drunk
driving.233 Likewise, Koehly’s second argument was also rejected.234 In
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner,235 the North Dakota Supreme Court
held N.D. Cent. Code § 29-05-20 “entitles an arrested individual to have a
reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding to take a
chemical test.”236 This statutory right is a “limited” right and “must be

222. Id. ¶ 5.
223. Id.
224. Id. ¶ 7.
225. Id.
226. Koehly, ¶ 7, 886 N.W.2d at 691.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. ¶ 9.
232. Koehly, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 691 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160,
2183-85 (2016)).
233. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.
234. Koehly, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 692.
235. 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987).
236. Id.
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balanced against the need for an accurate and timely chemical test.”237
Koehly argued police officers violated his limited right to counsel by
placing him in a recorded and monitored room, which would have allowed
officers to hear him speaking with his attorney.238 “Because Koehly made
no attempt to call a lawyer, [the Court did not decide] whether the right to
counsel would be violated by placing a person in a recorded and monitored
room while the person speaks with a lawyer.”239
The final issue the Court addressed was whether a person cures an
earlier refusal of a chemical test by conditionally consenting.240 “Whether a
person has cured an earlier refusal of a chemical test is determined by
whether the person consented to the second request for a chemical test and
whether the circumstances match the criteria outlined in Lund v. Hjelle:”241
[W]e hold that where, as here, one who is arrested for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor first refuses to
submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his
blood and later changes his mind and requests a chemical blood
test, the subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first
refusal when the request to take the test is made within a
reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test
administered upon the subsequent consent would still be accurate;
when testing equipment or facilities are still readily available;
when honoring a request for a test, following a prior first refusal,
will result in no substantial inconvenience or expense to the police;
and when the individual requesting the test has been in police
custody and under observation for the whole time since his
arrest.242
Additionally, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act,243 governs [the
Court’s] review of an administrative decision to suspend or revoke a
driver’s license.244 Under N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-49, the Court reviews
an appeal from a district court judgment in an administrative appeal in the
same manner as provided under N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-46, which
237. Koehly, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 692 (citing City of Mandan v. Leno, 2000 ND 184, ¶ 9,
618 N.W.2d 161, 163).
238. Id.
239. Id. ¶ 13.
240. Id. ¶ 14.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D. 1974)); see also Maisey v. N.D.
Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 191, ¶¶ 24-25, 775 N.W.2d 200, 208.
243. N.D. CENT. CODE. Ch. 28-32.
244. Koehly, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d at 693 (citing Erickson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 507
N.W.2d 537, 539 (N.D. 1993)).
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requires a district court to affirm an order of an administrative agency
unless it finds any of the following:
1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the
appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in
the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the
appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not
supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an
administrative law judge.245
The Court does not make independent findings of fact or substitute its
own judgment for that of the agency, but rather determines only whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the findings reached were
supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.246
Additionally, the Court in City of Bismarck v. Bullinger,247 said, “[a]
conditional response to a request to submit to chemical testing can be
interpreted either as consent or refusal, depending on the circumstances.
The driver must suffer the consequences of an officer’s reasonable
interpretation of the driver’s conditional response.”248
In the present case, the Court found that a rational mind reasonably
could have concluded Koehly did not cure his refusal.249 Moreover, the
record showed Koehly did condition his offer to cure.250 “He stated he
would take the breath test only if the officer stipulated in writing her refusal

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
2010 ND 15, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 904, 907.
Id.
Koehly, ¶ 18, 886 N.W.2d at 694.
Id.
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to allow him to take a blood test.”251 However, because Koehly did not
unconditionally consent to the breath test, the Court held that a reasoning
mind could have concluded he failed to consent to the test and therefore
failed to cure his earlier refusal.252

251. Id.
252. Id.
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FAMILY LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CHILD CUSTODY
Curtiss v. Curtiss
In Curtiss v. Curtiss,253 Rebecca Curtiss (“Rebecca”) moved to the
district court to suspend her former husband, Spencer Curtiss’s, (“Curtiss”)
parenting time of their children while he was incarcerated.254 The district
court granted Rebecca’s motion to modify Spencer’s parenting time and
subsequently denied Spencer’s motion to reconsider.255 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings
before modifying Spencer’s parenting time, and remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to make specific fact findings.256
Spencer and Rebecca had two minor children and later divorced.257
Spencer was awarded primary custody of the children by a district court in
Kansas.258 Spencer moved to North Dakota in 2009, and Rebecca moved to
North Dakota in 2010.259 In February 2011, Spencer was incarcerated at
the North Dakota State Penitentiary and remains incarcerated.260 Following
Spencer’s incarceration, Rebecca moved the North Dakota District Court to
amend the divorce judgment to give her primary custody of the children.261
Spencer agreed to give Rebecca primary custody, and the district court
entered an Amended Judgment, which awarded Spencer supervised
parenting time every other weekend at the state penitentiary.262
In July 2015, Spencer moved the district court to enforce the Amended
Judgment, arguing Rebecca was failing to bring the children to visit him at
the state penitentiary.263 Rebecca then moved the district court to modify
the Amended Judgment to suspend Spencer’s parenting time entirely while
he was incarcerated.264 In support of her motion, Rebecca cited concerns
that she and the children’s therapist believed visits to the state penitentiary
were harmful to the children.265
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2016 ND 197, 886 N.W.2d 565.
Curtiss, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 567.
Id. ¶ 1.
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Id. ¶ 2.
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Id.
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The district court scheduled a hearing to address the parties’
motions.266 The court allowed Spencer to participate in the hearing through
the Interactive Video Network (“IVN”), but stated he was responsible for
making the arrangements, noting the hearing would not be delayed if he
failed to do so.267 Spencer failed to appear via IVN at the December 4,
2015, hearing on the motions and the district court ruled in favor of
Rebecca.268
On December 22, 2015, the district court entered a third Amended
Judgment ordering that the children are not required to visit Spencer while
he was incarcerated, but if they wished to visit, a counselor or therapist
must be present to supervise.269 The district court further ordered all
communications of any kind between Spencer and the children to be
supervised by a therapist.270 Spencer moved the district court to reconsider,
and the district court denied the motion.271
Spencer appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that (1)
the district court did not have jurisdiction to amend the Kansas judgment;
(2) the district court violated his constitutional rights by not issuing an order
to the Department of Corrections demanding his appearance at the hearing;
(3) the district court failed to make findings of fact that a material change in
circumstances had been established to modify his parenting time; and (4)
the district court erred by not scheduling a hearing and ruling on his
motion.272
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court had
personal jurisdiction over Spencer under North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 4(b)(1).273 Spencer was incarcerated in
Burleigh County and, at the time of the case, he had already submitted to
the jurisdiction of the district court by moving to enforce the existing order
establishing parenting time.274
Second, the Court reasoned Spencer’s constitutional rights violation
argument was akin to a procedural due process argument.275 Procedural

266. Curtiss, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 567.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. ¶ 5.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Curtiss, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 568.
273. N.D. R. CIV. P. § 4(b)(1) (2017) states: “[a] court of this state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person found within, domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining
a principal place of business in, this state as to any claim for relief.”
274. Curtiss, ¶ 7, 886 N.W.2d at 568.
275. Id. ¶ 8.
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due process requires fundamental fairness, which necessitates notice and a
meaningful opportunity for a hearing.276
Under North Dakota’s
jurisprudence, the right to appear at a hearing may be satisfied by
appearance via telephone.277 Though, the district court did not have a duty
to ensure Spencer’s presence at the hearing via telephone.278 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court made clear to Spencer
that it was his responsibility to arrange communication through the
Department of Corrections.279 As such, the Court held the district court did
not violate Spencer’s constitutional rights by holding the December 4,
2015, meeting without him.280
Third, Spencer argued the district court failed to make adequate fact
findings that the modification of his parenting time was due to a material
change in circumstances.281 Under North Dakota statutory law, the district
court shall “grant such rights of parenting time as will enable the child to
maintain a parent-child relationship that will be beneficial to the child,
unless the court finds, after a hearing, that such rights of parenting time are
likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.”282 To modify
parenting time, Rebecca was required to demonstrate a material change in
circumstances had occurred since entry of the previous parenting time order
requiring her to bring the children to the state penitentiary to visit
Spencer.283 Parenting time for a parent without primary custody is
presumed to be in the child’s best interest and should only be withheld
when it is likely to endanger a child’s physical or emotional health.284 The
Court noted a district court may not rely solely upon the child’s wishes
regarding visitation285 and that the danger to a child’s physical or emotional
health must be demonstrated in detail.286
The Court found that the district court made no findings on the record
as to whether a material change in circumstances occurred, whether
suspended visitation is necessary to protect the children, and whether
modification of custody of the children was necessary to serve the best

276. Id. (quoting St. Claire v. St. Claire, 2004 ND 39, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d 175, 177).
277. Id. at 569 (quoting St. Claire, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d at 175).
278. St. Claire, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d at 175.
279. Curtiss, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 569.
280. Id.
281. Id. ¶ 10.
282. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-05-22.2 (2017)).
283. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Prchal v. Prchal, 2011 ND 62, ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d 693, 697).
284. Id. (citing Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, ¶ 21, 603 N.W.2d 896, 902).
285. Curtiss, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 570 (citing Votava v. Votava, 2015 ND 171, ¶ 15, 865
N.W.2d 821, 825).
286. Id. (citing Hendrickson, ¶ 21, 603 N.W.2d at 896).
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interests of the children.287 In its Order for Third Amended Judgment, the
district court did not provide any explanation for the basis of its fact
findings beyond stating “[h]aving heard the motion and supporting
evidence, and having knowledge of the record in this matter . . .” before
ruling that the children were no longer required to visit Spencer at the state
penitentiary.288 The district court’s order denying Spencer’s motion to
reconsider was similarly lacking in explanation,289 stating:
The evidence in this matter was clear. The children of the parties
are reluctant to visit their father in prison and have been working
with a counselor concerning their relationship with their father.
The order signed in December allows for contact by telephone call
and letter if arranged through the counselor. Rebecca Curtiss has
been reasonable in her response to the wish of the children
concerning parenting time.
The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.290
The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the district court
stating the children were reluctant to visit their father in prison and were
working with a counselor was insufficient to constitute a showing of danger
to the children’s physical or emotional health.291 Because of the district
court’s failure to either make and/or record sufficient findings of fact on the
record, the Court found the order amending custody was clearly erroneous
under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)292 and remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to make specific findings.293
The Court also noted the district court failed to make findings
regarding its reasoning as to why supervised parenting time by a therapist
was necessary to protect the children.294 Under Marquette v. Marquette,295
“a restriction on visitation must be based on a preponderance of the
evidence and be accompanied by a detailed demonstration of the physical or

287. Id. ¶ 13.
288. Id. (quoting the district court’s Order for Third Amended Judgment).
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting the district court’s Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration).
291. Curtiss, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 570-71.
292. N.D. R. CIV. P. § 52(a) (2017) states in relevant part:
In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must
find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and
conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear
in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court.
293. Curtiss, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 571.
294. Id. ¶ 14.
295. Marquette v. Marquette, 2006 ND 154, ¶ 9, 719 N.W.2d 321, 324.
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emotional harm likely to result from visitation.”296 Further, the district
court record is unclear whether it considered each child separately or
individually for either modification of custody or the necessity for
professional supervision of parenting time.297
Spencer’s final argument was that the district court erred by not
holding a hearing on his motion to enforce the provision requiring the
children to visit him while he was incarcerated.298 The record reflects that
the hearing for Spencer’s motion was to be held at the same time as the
hearing on Rebecca’s motion to amend custody to allow the children to
discontinue visitation while he was incarcerated on December 4, 2015.299
However, at that hearing, there was no mention of Spencer’s motion, nor
was the district court’s order mentioned.300 Further confusing the issue, the
judgment in favor of Rebecca’s motion to amend custody stated Spencer’s
motion was resolved by the December 4, 2015, hearing.301 Spencer raised
that issue in his motion for reconsideration, but the record but did not
reflect the district court’s fact findings in support of its decision to deny
reconsideration.302 The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to decide
whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Spencer’s
Motion to Reconsider because it had already determined to remand the case
to the district court for further fact findings regarding its basis for amending
custody.303

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Curtiss, ¶ 14, 886 N.W.2d at 571 (citing Marquette, ¶ 9, 719 N.W.2d at 321).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Curtiss, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d at 571.
Id. ¶ 16.
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FAMILY LAW – PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
CHILD – CHILD SUPPORT
Hildebrand v. Stolz
In Hildebrand v. Stolz,304 former girlfriend, Hildebrand, filed a
complaint requesting the partition of real property, primary residential
responsibility of child, and child support from former boyfriend, Stolz.305
The district court granted Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of
the children, ordered Stolz to pay child support, and partitioned real
property.306 Stolz then moved to vacate the judgment, which was denied.307
Stolz appealed.308 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s finding that it did not abuse its discretion. However, the judgment
incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court “on motion” and
“as a stipulated divorce action,” rather than as an action for partition of real
property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities.309
Hildebrand and Stolz were never married but had three children
together.310 In Hildebrand’s complaint, she requested the partition of their
real property, primary residential responsibility of their three children, and
child support payments from Stolz.311 In Stolz’s answer, he denied that
Hildebrand was the proper person to have primary residential responsibility
and sole decision making responsibilities of their children.312
A trial date was set for April 29, 2015.313 Prior to trial, Stolz’s attorney
moved the court to allow her to withdrawal as counsel.314 Before the
withdrawal, Stolz stated that all correspondence was to be forwarded to
him.315 The motion to withdraw was granted on April 28, 2015, with the
first day of trial to proceed on April 29, 2015.316 Stolz was not present;
however, trial proceeded and the court heard testimony and received
exhibits from Hildebrand.317 Hildebrand served the post-trial brief on Stoltz

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

2016 ND 225, 888 N.W.2d 197.
Id. ¶ 1, 888 N.W.2d at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stolz, ¶ 2, 888 N.W.2d at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Stolz, ¶ 4, 888 N.W.2d at 199.
Id.
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on September 11, 2015, and on October 5, 2015, the district court issued its
order.318 The district court found Stolz in default for failing to appear at the
trial, awarded primary residential responsibility to Hildebrand, required
Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments, and ordered the
partition of real property held jointly by Hildebrand and Stolz.319 Prior to
the entry of judgement, Stolz hired a new attorney who filed a motion to
vacate judgement on the grounds that Stolz was not aware of the trial date
because his previous attorney never notified him of such date.320
Hildebrand’s reply to Stolz motion contained an affidavit from their
daughter stating that Stolz was aware of the trial date.321 “Relying on the
affidavit from the parties’ daughter, the district court found it was “more
likely than not that [Stolz] was aware of the April 29, 2015 trial date.”322
Further, the court concluded that Stolz had an obligation to keep himself
informed of his ongoing litigation.323 The district court denied Stolz’s
motion to vacate and entered the judgment.324 Stolz appealed.325
Stolz moved to vacate the district court’s memorandum and order
under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 60(b),
which provides that a party may only move for relief from a “final
judgment or order.”326 The memorandum and order was not a final
judgment.327 The district court, however, considered Stolz’s motion under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).328 Because a consistent judgment was subsequently
entered, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered Stolz’s arguments in
the context of N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).329
Stolz’s argument on appeal is that the district court erred in denying his
motion to vacate judgement.330 The standard of review for a district court’s
determination on a motion to vacate is well settled:
A motion to vacate lies with the “sound discretion of the trial
court, and its decision whether to vacate the judgment will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion.” “A
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Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. at 200.
Stolz, ¶ 5, 888 N.W.2d at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Stolz, ¶ 6, 888 N.W.2d at 200.
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district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable manner.” “A trial court acts in an
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner when its
decision is not the product of a rational mental process by which
the facts and law relied upon are stated and considered together for
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable
determination.” “An abuse of discretion also occurs when a
district court misinterprets or misapplies the law.” A selfrepresented party should not be treated differently nor allowed any
more or any less consideration than parties represented by
counsel.331
Stolz argued that the district court misapplied the law in entering the
default judgment. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
the district court found Stolz to be in “default” but did not enter and default
judgment.332 None of the procedural requirements for a default judgment
after an appearance had been made were requested or applied.333 Moreover,
the district court heard testimony and took evidence. Because this was not
a default judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined Stolz’s
request “to apply remedial considerations applicable to default
judgments.”334
Stolz next argued that the district court erred in granting his previous
attorney’s motion to withdraw.335 He based his argument on the fact that
the motion to withdraw was granted one day before trial and the district
court did not check to see if Stolz was aware of trial before granting the
motion.336 The Court was unable to find authority to support Stolz’s
positon and did not overturn the district court’s decision granting the
motion to withdraw.337 Additionally, the motion to withdraw complied
with the North Dakota Rules of Court 11.2 and 3.2 and N.D.R.Civ.P.
6(e)(1).338 Furthermore, Stolz consented to the withdrawal.339
Stolz further argued that the district court erred in finding that he had
notice of the trial date.340 The district court’s determination that Stolz knew
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332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
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338.
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Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Stolz, ¶ 9, 888 N.W.2d at 201.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
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Stolz, ¶ 11, 888 N.W.2d at 202.
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of the trial date is a finding of fact, which the North Dakota Supreme Court
will not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.341
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an
erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if
the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite
and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Under the clearly
erroneous standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence or
reassess the credibility of witnesses[.]342
Stolz based this argument on the fact that he never personally received
notice of the trial date from the court, opposing counsel, or his attorney, and
argued that “motions to vacate should be granted when the mistake or
neglect is the fault of a third party.”343 The Court rejected this argument
because Stolz failed to show that his failure to appear at the hearing was the
mistake of his attorney.344 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the
lower court “considered the affidavits in evidence, and was not clearly
erroneous by finding Stolz had notice of the trial date based on his
daughter’s affidavit.”345 As a result, the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Stolz motion to vacate for mistake or excusable
neglect under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).346
Next the court looked at N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), which is a “catch-all”
provision that allows a district court to grant relief from a judgment for ‘any
other reason that justifies relief.’347 The Court rejected this argument as
well, finding that in the district court’s order denying Stolz’s motion to
vacate, “the district court stated ‘[e]ven if [Stolz] was not made aware by
Ms. Nemec, he had an obligation as a self-represented party to apprise
himself of the status of this litigation which has been ongoing since March
2012.’”348 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Stolz’s motion to vacate under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) and in
general.349

341.
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Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (2017)).
Id. (quoting Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 7, 764 N.W.2d 675, 681).
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
Stolz, ¶ 14, 888 N.W.2d at 202.
Id. ¶ 16, 888 N.W.2d at 203.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 888 N.W.2d at 204.
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ZONING AND PLANNING—MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Dakota Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. City of Bismarck
In Dakota Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. City of Bismarck,350 Dakota
Outdoor Advertising, LLC (“Dakota”), appealed a district court order
affirming the Bismarck Board of Commissioner’s (“Board”) decision
affirming the Bismarck Planning and Zoning Commission’s
(“Commission”) denial of an application for a special use permit.351 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding
that (1) Dakota’s appeal from the district court order was not moot;352 and
(2) the Commission’s decision to deny Dakota’s application for a special
use permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.353
Dakota entered into a lease with Boutrous Group (“Boutrous”), the
owner of property in Bismarck, ND near the intersection of East Capitol
Avenue and State Street, intending to erect a digital billboard on the
property.354 The City of Bismarck’s Code of Ordinances (“Code”) required
Dakota to obtain a special use permit before it could erect the billboard
because it would be located less than 300 feet from a residential property.355
Dakota and Boutrous applied for the special use permit to the Commission
and met with city staff on December 10, 2014, to present studies regarding
issues of whether digital billboards create an unreasonable risk of driver
distraction.356 The Commission held a public hearing on the special use
permit on January 28, 2015.357 At the hearing, Dakota testified about the
studies it presented to the Commission, and a police officer testified about
the frequent accidents at the intersection.358 The Commission then denied
the application, by an eight-to-one vote.359
Dakota and Boutrous appealed the Commission’s denial of the special
use permit to the Board, and a hearing was held on the issue on March 24,
2015.360 All parties were allowed to present evidence at the hearing, and
the Board affirmed the Commission’s decision to deny the special use
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2016 ND 210, 886 N.W.2d 670.
Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 671.
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permit on March 30, 2015.361 Dakota then appealed the Board’s and
Commission’s decisions to the district court.362 The district court ordered
the appeal be dismissed without prejudice after the parties stipulated to
dismissal.363 Dakota and the Board presented briefs and a record, and the
district court affirmed the Board’s decision and entered judgment on
February 22, 2016.364
Code ordinances regulating placement of digital billboards were
changed since the district court entered judgment on the issue.365 The
ordinance governing siting of digital billboards366 no longer includes a
provision for obtaining a special use permit for a digital billboard at a
distance of less than 300 feet.367 The current provisions governing digital
billboards would not permit Dakota to obtain a special use permit for the
proposed site.368
The Board argues Dakota’s appeal to the Supreme Court is moot
because the City of Bismarck no longer permits special use permits for
digital billboards less than 300 feet from a residential area.369 At the time
of Dakota’s application to the Commission, obtaining a special use permit
would have allowed Dakota to erect the billboard at a distance of 150 feet
from a residential area.370 By the time Dakota appealed to the Court, the
150 feet exception had been repealed, and special use permits no longer
afforded an exception to the 300 feet rule.371 The Board petitioned the
Court to apply the current ordinance to the case, making it impossible to
obtain a permit and thus rending its appeal moot.372 The Court declined to

361. Id.
362. Id. ¶ 5.
363. Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶5, 886 N.W.2d at 671-72.
364. Id. at 672.
365. Id. ¶ 6.
366. CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-03-08(3)(b)(2) (2017) states in
relevant part: “[a] site plan is submitted showing the overall dimensions of the sign, the location of
the sign and any appurtenant features. The site plan shall be accompanied by a narrative
description of operational elements of the sign including illumination and any electronic
functions.”
367. Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 672.
368. Id.
369. Id. ¶ 7.
370. Id. (citing CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-04-12(5) (repealed
Mar. 8, 2016) stating in relevant part: “[d]igital billboards must be located at least three hundred
(300) feet from any [residential zoning district] . . . [t]his distance may be reduced to one hundred
fifty (150) feet in accordance with the following provisions [if] . . . [a] special use permit is
approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section
14-03-08.”).
371. Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 672; see CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-03-08 (2017).
372. Id.
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do so, citing concerns about retroactively legislating a provision into the
Code.373 The Code states that “[n]o part of this code is retroactive unless it
is expressly declared to be so.”374 No provision of the current Code relating
to digital billboards contains such a provision regarding retroactive
application.375 Therefore, the Court held that Dakota’s appeal was not
moot.376
Dakota argued the Board’s decision to deny a special use permit was
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, contending the studies they
presented to the Commission and Board supported a grant of the special use
permit.377 Dakota further contends no evidence presented supported denial
of the permit.378 The principle of separation of powers precludes the Court
from re-deciding issues decided by a local government body379 and affords
the Court a limited scope of review.380 The Board’s decision could only be
overturned by a showing that it acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably in reaching its decision.”381 The arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable standard is defined as follows:
A decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable if the
exercise of discretion is the product of a rational mental process by
which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together for
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable
interpretation.382
Dakota argued the Board failed to properly consider the studies it
presented in support of approval of the special use permit.383 The Court
stated that the Board was under no obligation to accept the studies and that
Dakota carried the burden of convincing the Board to accept the studies it
presented.384 The Board concluded the studies submitted were “at best,
inconclusive” and failed to address the “cumulative effect of driving
distractions.”385 The Board found the North Dakota Department of
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Transportation’s report that the billboard was located at the seventh most
dangerous intersection in the State of North Dakota and the second most
dangerous intersection in the City of Bismarck more compelling than the
studies submitted by Dakota.386
The Court reasoned the Board reached a reasonable decision in
weighing the evidence presented by both parties to conclude the intersection
was too dangerous to allow a special use permit for a digital billboard
nearby under the Code provision governing special use permits in
residential zones which states “‘[t]he proposed use will not adversely affect
the health and safety of the public and the workers and residents in the area’
before a special use permit can be approved.”387 The Court concluded the
Board’s opinion that the digital billboard would pose a danger to the public
was the product of a rational mental process in which the Commissioners
exercised discretion.388 Accordingly, the Court held the Board’s decision to
deny Dakota’s application for a special use permit to erect a digital
billboard less than 300 feet from a residential neighborhood at a dangerous
intersection was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.389
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Id. at 674.
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